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1. SUMMARY: Resp pleaded guilty to bank robbery but when . 
called as a witness in another trial, refused to answer certain questions 
on grounds of possible self-incrimination since he had not yet been 
sentenced. Resp was granted immunity but when he persisted in his 
refusal,was summarily held in contempt. CA 2 (Feinberg, Lumbard, -- ---- --------
Friendly) rejected resp 1 s Fifth Amendment claim in view of the grant of . . 
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the subject of summary contempt proceedings and reversed and remanded 
the case. The SG claims summary proceedings were appropria te. 
2. FACTS: Resp was charged along with Robert Ander son with 
armed robbery of a bank. Resp pleaded guilty, but prior to sentencing was 
called as a witness against Anderson, who was being tried for that and 
another bank robbery. Resp refused to testify, however, claiming -
revelation of the details of the crime might affect the ultimate sentence he 
in fact received. The judge in USDC granted resp immunity pursuant to 
18 U.S. C. § § 6002-03, and when resp persisted in his refusal to answer 
certain questions, summarily found him in contempt and sentenced him to 
six months' imprisonment to be served consecutively with his ultimate 
sentence on the robbery charges. 
CA 2 held that (1) in view of the grant of immunity, resp could not 
invoke his Fifth Amendment claims but should simply have sought sentencing 
before another judge, but that (2) under its recent decision in United States 
v. Marra, 482 F. 2d 1196 (1973), the summary criminal contempt sanction 
of F. R. C. P. Rule 42(a) was inappropriate in the case of an orderly refusal 
to testify on Fifth Amendment grounds despite a grant of immunity, but -----~--~---~------------ ---- - ~ 
that upon notice a hearing should rave been held under Rule 42(b), allowing 
resp time to prepare his defense. Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. 162 
. (1965). 
F. R. Cr. P. provides in pertinent part: 
(a) Summary Disposition. A criminal contempt may 
punished summarily if the judge certifies that he saw or 
heard the conduct constituting the contempt and that it was 
committed in the actual presence of the court. The order 
of contempt shall recite the facts and shall be signed 
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(b) Disposition Upon Notice and Hearing. A 
criminal contempt except as provided in subdivision 
(a) of this rule shall ·be prosecuted on notice. The 
notice shall state the time and place of hearing, allowing 
a reasonable time for the preparation of the defense, and shall 
· state the essential facts constituti15the criminal contempt 
charged and describe it as such. . . . The defendant is 
entitled to a trial b_y j ury in any case in which an act of 
Congress so provides. He is entitled to admission to bail 
as provided in these rules. If the con tempt charged 
involves disrespect to or criticism of a judge, that judge 
is disqualified from presiding at the tric,l or hearing 
except with the defendant's consent. Upon a verdict or 
finding of guilt the court shall enter an order fixing the 
punishment. 
3. CONTENTIONS: 
(a) The SG seeks cert claiming (1) CA 2 has . unjustifiably extended 
this Court's ruling in Harris v. United States, supra, which involved only 
a refusal to testify before a grand jury, and not at trial. Here, unlike the 
· grand jury proceedings in Harris, the contempt was in open court in the 
I( p~g e, disrupting the proceedings through delay. Here, the refusal to testify resulted in the collapse of the prosecution's case 
against Anderson [ who was acquitted at the close of the government's 
~
case]. Harris requires only that the contempt be committed in the 
presence of the court and its extension to these facts would greatly infringe 
upon the power of courts to compel testimony by a recalcitrant witness. 
In view of the short life of a criminal petit jury as opposed to a grand jury, 
civil contempt proceedings would be totally ineffective and would substantial!> 
disrupt such trials. (2) The decision below as well as the holdings of 
CA 2 in United States v. Marra, supra, and United States v. Pace, 371 





- - 4 - -
decisions in Baker v. Eisenstadt, 456 F. 2d 382 (CA 1), cert. denied, 
409 U.S. 846 (1972), and United States v. Seavers, 472F.2d 607 
(CA 6 1973). 
(3) If Harris is deemed applicable in the trial context, the Court 
should overrule Harris. 
There is ~ response. 
4. DISCUSSION: In Harris, overruling Brown v. United States, 
359 U.S. 41 (1959), the Court held that a grand jury witness who refused 
to testify despite a grant of immunity could not be subject to summary 
contempt proceedings under Rule 42(a) merely by having him appear in 
open court and again refuse to testify, but rather that the witness must be 
accorded the full contempt procedures of Rule 42(b). The court there 
noted that the sumrnary procedures were reserved for exceptional 
circumstances such as acts threatening the judge or disrupting a hearing 
or obstructing court proceedings. The question in this case really turns 
on whether it is the fact of disruption or delay of court proceedings alone 
or the nature of the disruption, i.e. actions showing disrespect for the 
court, which trigger summary procedures. 
My reading of Harris indicates that it was primarily the need to 
vindicate the dignity of the court which was thought to justify Rule 42(a) 
procedures, meaning such procedures would not be appropriate where the 
contempt is an orderly refusal to answer questions on Fifth Amendment 
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•.. Summary contempt is for 11misbehavior 11 (Ex parte 
Terry, 128 U.S. 28 9, 314) in the 11 actual presence of 
the court. 11 Then speedy punishm.ent may be necessary 
in order to achieve 11 summary vindication of the court's 
dignity and authority. 11 Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 
' 517, 534 .... 
... Even though we assurne arguendo that Rule 42(a) 
may at times reach testimonial episodes, nothing in this 
case indicates that petitioner 1 s refusal was such an open, 
serious threat to orderly procedure that instant and 
summary punishment, as distinguished from due and 
deliberate procedures (Cooke v. United States, supra, 
at 536), was necessary .... [T]he dignity of the court 
was not being affronted: no disturbance had to be quelled; 
no insolent tactics had to be stopped. The contempt here 
committed was far outside the narrow category envisioned 
by Rule 42(a). 
However, there is a substantial difference between grand jury and 
~~ 
trial proceedings in terms of the impact on each of a refusal to testify, 
and the Court was not unmindful of the distinction when it noted that 
"[s]wiftness was not a prerequisite of justice here. Delay necessary 
for a hearing would not imperil the grand jury proceedings. 11 382 U.S. 
at 164. A grand jury generally has a longer tenure than a trial jury, 
and the delay necessary for a contempt hearing may be insignificant 
in that other witness es will be called before it in the interim, or it may 
adjourn. A trial jury, on the other hand is considerably more in~··, ,, \ ,'i -~, .. d 
and the delay might result in the termination of the case, i.e. 11 imperil 
· the proceedings, 11 in the language of the Harris Court. 
However, it is not really the delay which imperils the proceedings 
in the end but rather the continued refusal of the witness to testify. 
Lurking in the background is thus the fear that the loss of summary powers 
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testimony. The added threat of summary procedures is thus thought 
necessary not to preserve the dignity of the Court, but primarily to 
compel testimony in some circumstances. 
Arguably, the threat of summary procedures itself will produce 
a marginal increase in the willingness of sorne witnes!'eSto testify, but 
in response I would note only that (a) the contempt power was meant less 
as a means of directly aiding or promoting prosecution, and more as a 
means of punishing particular conduct, although also with the intent of 
promoting orderly litigation,and thus to the extent the power is invoked 
primarily in aid of prosecution, it seems one moves away from its 
historical justification. (b) More important, the marginal gain in the 
compulsion of testimony m.ust be weighed against the damage these 
procedures do to the notion of Due Process, or procedural regularity. 
The historical abuse of summary contempt powers resulting in the modern 
limitations thereupon, does not bear recitation here, but the desire of 
this Court that such procedures be used only in "those unusual situations 
envisioned by Rule 42(a) where instant action is necessary to protect the 
judicial institution~ , its elf" em.erges clearly from Harris. It is not 
at all clear that the concern for delay expressed by the SG is nearly as 
substantial as claimed, since contempt procedures ordinarily can be held 
in a few days, and in most cases would not damage the trial proceedings by 
that delay alone. lt seems · that the is sue raised here really 
goes to the availability of summary procedures to compel testimony and the 
Court should view the problem in those terms rather than focusing simply 
'.,-. l , 
-
~-
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upon the delay occasioned in the proceedings. Thus viewed, it becomes 
a question of the effectiveness of the various means of compelling testimony, 
and consideration should be given to a range of possibilities including civil 
contempt as well as the summary procedures involved here. 
The merits aside, there is a conflict between the decisions of ~A 2 
and that of CA 6 in Baker v. Eisenstadt, supra. [In Seaver, though a ,. ______ 
summary contempt conviction was upheld, the issue raised here was not 
discussed. The question was rather one as to the length of sentence 
imposed.] Baker rejected the extension of Harris, in reliance upon 
Groppi v. Leslie, 404 U.S. 496, 504-5 (197 ), where this Court noted: 
Where a court acts immediately to punish 
for contemptuous conduct committed under its 
eye, the contemnor is present, of course, There 
is then no question of identity, nor is hearing 
in a formal sense necessary because the judge 
has personally seen the offense and is acting on 
the basis of his own observations. Moreover, in 
such a situation, the contemnor has normally 
been given an opportunity to speak in his own 
behalf in the nature of a right of allocution. 
Groppi, however, involved a summary contempt vote by the legislature 
-\',\ ... ,. '"'ff\.i.., -following the occupation of its chambers by a group,rcb.on far different 
from an orderly refusal to testify. 
A response should be called for in any event. 
There is no response, 
Siegel CA 2 Op -- petn appx 
3/5/74 
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BENCH MEMORANDUM 
TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: Penny Clark DATE: December 13, 1974 
No. 73-1162 United States v. Wilson 
In this case, the Government appeals CA 2's ruling 
that the District Court erred in using surrrrnary procedures to 
punish Respondents for their respectful, orderly refusal to 
testify in a criminal trial. 
The issues are well delineated and backed by two 
centuries of law on sunnnary contempt. There is no question 
that Respondents' refusal to testify amounted to criminal 
contempt. Rule 42(a), which authorizes sunnnary punishment -of contempt, is broadly written: "A criminal contempt may 
be punished surrrrnarily if the judge certifies that he saw 
or heard the conduct constituting the contempt and that it 
was connnitted in the actual presence of the court." Case 
law, however, has limited that broad rule, both as a matter 
of interpretation and under constitutional principles. 
The constitutional limits on surrrrnary contempt and 
the limits this Court has placed on Rule 42(a) and its 






Court has not distinguished between cases arising in state 
courts and those coming from federal courts. That is 
because the restrictions on summary contempt have always 
been regarded as a necessary balance between the necessity 
for courts to preserve their dignity and authority, and the 
individual's right to a full hearing before incarceration ~ 
for a criminal offense. In Ex Parte Terry, 128 U.S. 288, 313 
(1888), where the Court affirmed a surnmary contempt conviction 
for assaulting a marshal in the courtroom, it stressed this 
delicate balance and emphasized that without the power to 
punish surnmary contempt "judicial tribunals would be at 
the mercy of th~ disorderly and violent, who respect neither 
the laws enacted for the vindication of public and private 
rights, nor the officers charged with the duty of administering 
them." And, like subsequent cases, Terry delineated the 
basic condition required for the exercise of surnmary contempt 
power: that the contempt be connnitted in the presence of the - -
court, so that no evidence need be taken to establish the 
offense. Id. at 308-09; Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 
517, 534-35 (1925). This prerequisite for surnmary procedures 
has never been questioned. The issue producing the most 
difficulty has been the class of conduct to which it may 






Court reversed a Michigan st.nnmary contempt based on a 
judge's belief that a witness had committed perjury during 
an investigative proceeding. (The judge was sit t ing as a 
one-man grand jury, but he was also wearing his judge's hat.) 
Writing for the Court, Justice Black emphasized the narrow 
limits on summary contempt: 
"Except for a narrowly limited category of 
contempts, due process of law as explained in 
the Cooke case requires that one charged with 
contempt of court be advised of the charges 
against him, have a reasonable opportunity to 
meet them by way of defense or explanation, have 
the right to be represented by counsel, and have 
a chance to testify and call other witnesses in 
his behalf, either by way of defense or explanation. 
/
The narrow exceptiop to these due process require-
ments "Tnctuaes only charges of misconduct, in open 
court, intlie presence of tnejiiage, wfiich clistur bs 
t e cour 's business, where all of the essent i a l 
elements o t e misconduct are under the eye of 
the court, are actually observed by the court, and 
where innnediate punishment is essential to prevent 
'demoralization of the court's authority' 
before the public." 
Id. at 275. 
The ~ xten_E to which refusal to testify may amount to 
conduct that "disturbs the court's business" and requires 
~
innnediate punishment ''to prevent 'demoralization of the 
court's authority' before the public" has produced the issue 
in this case. The Court has held that suspected perjury 
--------------cannot be punished as contempt because it is not the kind 





of contempt power. In re Michael, 326 U.S. 224 (1945); 
Ex Parte Hudgings, 249 U.S. 378 (1919). B~ those case~, ~ 
however, recognized "[t]hat the conttnnacious refusal of 
a witness to testify may so directly obstruct a court in 
the performance of its duty as to justify punishment for 
contempt." Id. at 382. (These cases did not involve the 
choice between surmnary contempt and contempt on notice 
and hearing). 
Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41 (1959), and Harris 
v. United States, 382 U.S. 162 (1965), are the only cases 
involving the use of surmnary procedures to punish refusal 
to testify.• Justice Stewart wrote the opinion in Brown, 
holding that a witness who refused to answer questions in 
a grand jury could be brought before a judge and be ordered 
to answer, and upon repeating his contempt before the judge 
could be punished surrnnarily for contempt. The Court held 
that the contempt was connnitted in the presence of the 
court, but did not address the question whether a refusal 
to testify could be deemd such an obstruction of the court's 
work as to merit summary punishment. Harris overruled ;k~ 
~-~ 
Brown on identical facts, disagreeing on the one issue Brown ~
addressed and relying on the other as well. The opinion 
(written by Justice Douglas) can only be taken to mean both 
hat the repetition of an initial contempt cannot be deemed 
• ~ is ~ o~ le.1/iN._ "· ~t.t.4, .S1-;i-tu,., bv-r ;t 
,/ J 
~!lo-wt.cl TutoUH\ ~c! -w-ll4.. ~tl a.J..o.-.,.j ~ -~ 







a contempt in the presence of the court anct-1:liat the refusal - ______, 
to testify was not 11such an open, serious threat to orderly --
procedure that instant and st.llillilary punishment, as distinguished 
-
from due and deliberate procedures [citing Cooke] was 
necessary." "In the instant case, the dignity of the 
court was not being affronted: no disturbance had to be 
quelled; no insolent tactics had to be stopped. The contempt 
here corrnnitted wa s far outside the narrow category envisioned 
by Rule 42(a)." 382 U.S. at 165. Justice Stewart dissented • 
Harris assumed "arguendo that Rule 42(a) may at times 
#c~ 
reach testimonial episodes." Id. Since k . did not involve 
an ongoing criminal trial, it can be distinguished from 
the present cases - easily, on the ground that the contempt 
must be corrnnitted in the presence of the judge ab initio; 
but with more difficulty, on the ground that the refusal to 
testify was no affront to the dignity of the court. On 
the latter point, the Harris opinion does note that delay for 
a more leisurely contempt proceeding would not have imperiled 
the grand jury proceedings. Unless lengthy, a criminal trial 
is likely to differ on this score. Nonetheless, the opinion 
strongly suggests that simple frustration of a judicial 
.___________ -- - -
proceeding might not be enough to authorize St.llillilary 
~






between stmnnary contempt and contempt on notice. In the 
context of a refusal to testify in trial, sunnnary proceedings 
will seldom dispense with the defendant's presence. The 
defendant will usually be allowed to speak on his own 
behalf, but he .. may be denied an opportunity to consult 
with his attorney, as was one of Respondents here (he was 
allowed to consult with the other respondent's attorney, 
but his own attorney was not present). At times there 
may be factual issues that would benefit from calling 
witnesses. But almost without exception, the defendant ( 
will be denied a meaningful opportunity to prepare a defense, 
perhaps on difficult Fifth Amendment questions. 
The issue in this case should be whether the need 
for immediate punishment of disobedience to an order to 
testify outweighs the witness's interest in notice and a 
-
more deliberate hearing. 
Not all refusals to testify would obstruct judicial 
business. The anticipated testimony could be either immaterial 
or Clllllulative, and there may be no way to tell until more 
evidence has been presented. On the other hand, some 
testimony could be crucial to a case, and if the witness 
disobeys a proper order to testify, it could be a significant 







treated by a combination of inunediate civil contempt and 
notice to show cause why criminal contempt should not be 
entered. This course, being the "least possible power -
adequate to the end proposed," should be encouraged, if 
not required. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1826, civil contempt 
can be imposed stnmnarily whenever a witness refuses to 
testify "without just cause." Incarceration may not 
exceed the life of the court proceeding, and the witness 
earns no criminal record. 
For me, t hese considerations weigh strongly against 
any -across-the-board rule on orderly refusals to testify 
in a criminal trial. Either alternative--holding that 
no orderly refusal to testify may be stnmnarily punished 
as criminal contempt, or holding that all of them may be 
would undermine the established rule that summary criminal 
contempt is designed for use in situations requiring 
innnediate action to remove or punish obstruction of the 
court's function. Some refusals to testify, ~hough 
orderly, might constitute such an obstruction and the -c i rcmnstances might make use of civil contempt (even if ------followed by citation for criminal contempt proceedings) 








summarily, despite the availability of summary civil 
contempt, would subvert the careful limits the Court has 
placed on the exercise of summary contempt powers. 
For these reasons, I would take the position that 
the refusal to t estify, to justify summary criminal 
contempt, must be such that it obstructs or frustrates 
(or is very likely to obstruct or frustrate) a just 
termination of the case. I would also require that the 
~emet~ 
civil contemptAbe expressly considered as an alternative. 
Taking this position, I would reverse CA 2's judgment and 
ea~ 
remand the case for a determination whether~Respondent's 
refusal , to testify satisfied those standards. 
-
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CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS December 20, 1974 
Dear Chief': 
I will assign the opinion in 
73-1162, U.S. v. WILSON to Justice Brennan. 
✓ 
evuO . · 
William o. Do:ugl-~ 
The Chief' Justice 
cc: The Conference 
----~-~ . 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
- • .§u:.prtmt <!Jonrl .ttf i4t ~ h ;§taftg 
J)rlllllp:nghtn, ~. (!J. 21Tffe'l-~ 
f'· December 2 3, 1974 
\?-r;,,U 
Re: No. 73-1162 - United States v. Wilson and Bryan 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
I will prepare a dis sent in this case. 
PERSONAL 
P. S. To Mr. Justice White 
Mr. Justice Blaclanun 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
Regards, 
UAN 
Ever optimistic I ho d . ,-..,_ ~ ,ji._ '~e~y,,..;."\~f,( b~rr~sistible,-
~~~-~-r-~ M 11 --
~ -" r . I 
.. ~ - -- 5 ~ -
CHAMBERS 0,-
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
I 
~tUU QJouri of tJtt ~~ .jtatt• 












k iTe ~las 
Justice Brennan 
Justic@ Stewart 





1975 ,,, From : l1ic• Chief' Justice 
Circulated : JAN 2 1975 
Recirculated: -~--~--
Re: No. 73-1162 - United States v. Wilson and Bryan 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
This case concerns summary contempt citations of respondents 
Thomas Wilson and Bobby Bryan for refusing to answer questions in a • .r 
criminal trial after they had been granted immunity from prosecution. 
~) 





(I) Robert Anderson was on trial for armed robberies of two 
banks, one in Tuxedo, New York, and one in Mount Ivy, New York. 
Respondent Wilson had been charged with Anderson for armed robbery 
of the bank in Tuxedo, New York; respondent Bryan had been charged 
with Anderson for armed robbery of the Mount Ivy bank. Prior to 
Anderson's trial both Wilson and Bryan pleaded guilty to some of the 
charges against them. Bryan was given a provisional twenty-five year 
sentence and Wilson was not immediately sentenced. The government 
"' 
I • - 2 -
then called both Wilson and Bryan as witnesses against Anderson. However, 
when questioned, each refused to respond on the ground that their answers 
might incriminate them. Respondents claimed they were being "whipsawed. 
11 
App., at 33. They argued, on the one hand, that their testimony might 
adversely affect final disposition of their own cases by informing the sentencing 
judge of the details of the crimes. On the other hand, they contended that if 
they did not answer they would be held in contempt and that would adversely 
affect their sentences. Relying on a recent case from the Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit, United States v. Goldberg, 4 72 F. 2d 513, 516 (CA 2, 
1973 ), the District Judge rejected their contention and granted each respondent 
immunity, 18 U.S. C. 6002, 6003(b). 
Respondents nevertheless persisted in their refusals and the judge 
explained that due to the grant of immunity their claims that their answers 
would tend to incriminate them were no longer valid because they could not 
be prosecuted on the basis of any answer given so long as they did not testify 
falsely under oath. App. at 17-18, 31. Despite this assurance, respondents 
continued to refuse to answer questions concerning their acquaintance with 
Anderson and the judge summarily held them in contempt. Counsel for Wilson, 
who acted for both respondents, made no objection to the summary nature 
of the contempt citation and did not ask for additional time to respond to it. 
I • 
- 3 -
Each respondent was sentenced to six months' imprisonment to 
run consecutively to any sentence imposed for the bank robberies for which 
they had pleaded guilty. The judge made it clear he would consider 
reducing the contempt sentences, App. 21-22, or eliminating them 
completely if the respondents decided to testify, App. 32. When counsel 
pointed out a 90-day pre-sentence study was being prepared on Wilson 
the judge responded that ''I am going to impose the maximum ••• with 
the deliberate intention of revising that sentence to what might be appro-
priate in light of the very study that is going to be made." App. 33. 
Although the records show no overt contumacious conduct by 
respondents other than refusal to answer questions, the judge told counsel 
"I think we cannot delay this trial. I cannot delay it. I have many other 
matters that are equally important to the people concerned in those cases 
which are following." App. 6. The trial continued without respondents' 
testimony and Anderson was convicted of tha:Tuxedo robbery; but without 
Bryan's testimony the government's case on the Mount Ivy bank robbery 
concluded with an acquittal of Anderson. 
The Court of Appeals rejected respondents' claim that it would 
have violated their Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination 
to have been compelled to testify, but concluded that the trial judge should 
not have used the summary contempb:power, Rule 42(a); the case was 
I • - 4 -
remanded for a hearing under Rule 42(b). The Court of Appeals did not 
agree with the government that respondents had already had the substance 
if not the form of a Rule 42(b) hearing. It concluded that it was bound by its 
own holding in United States v. Marra, 482 F. 2d 1196, which was based on 
Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. 162 (1965). The Court of Appeals reasoned 
that "If ..• counsel had been given 1 a reasonable time for the preparation of 
the defense, ' Fed. R. Crim. P. 42(b); she might have marshalled and 
presented facts in mitigation of the charges. 11 Slip Op. at 7. For example, 
the court mentioned that respondent Wilson's experience suggests the 
possibility of a psychiatric defense. Perhaps with additional time to 
prepare, counsel might have "shown a relationship between any psychological 
difficulties and the refusal to serve as a witness." Id. at 8. 
(2) The Court of Appeals concluded its decision was controlled by 
United States v. Marra, 482 F. 2d 1196 (CA 2, 1973 ), which 
involved a similar non-violent refusal to answer on Fifth Amendment 
grounds despite a grant of immunity. The Court of Appeals also relied 
upon its own holding in United States v. Pace, 3 71 F. 2d 810 (CA 2, 196 7), 
which extended Harris and held: 
I • 
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"[S]ummary disposition is thus available only when 
immediate punishment is necessary to put an end to 
acts disrupting the proceedings, such as threats to 
the judge, disturbances in the courtroom or insolence 
before the court. It is not a remedy to be used in a 
case like this where the contempt consists of no more 
than orderly refusal in the absence of the jury to 
answer a question on Fifth Amendment grounds. • • • 11 
371 F. 2d at 811. 
The Marra court stated that the proper procedure would be to hold the 
reluctant witness in civil contempt, 28 U ,S.C. § 1826, pending a Rule 42(b) 
hearing, Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364 (1966), and then perhaps 
hold the witness for criminal contempt. The court stated that this pro-
cedure 
"lessens the risk that the witness' contumacy is the 
result of fright, confusion, or misunderstanding. 
Indeed, with the advice of counsel, or faced with 
imposition of a criminal sentence, he may decide 
to cooperate." 
482 F. 2d at 1202. 
The Marra court agreed that its decision conflh:ted with the decision 
of the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in Baker v. Eisenstadt, 456 
F. 2d 382 (CA 1), cert denied, 409 U.S. 846. In Baker the First Circuit 
had rejected Pace,. and relied upon Groppi v. 
Leslie, 404U.S. 496 (1972), where we said: 
"Where a court acts immediately to punish for 
contemptuous conduct committed under its eye, the 
contemnor is present of course. There is then no 
question of identity, nor is hearing in a formal sense 
I • 
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necessary because the judge has personally seen 
the offense and is acting on the basis of his own 
observations. Moreover, in such a situation, the 
contemnor has normally been given an opportunity 
to speak in his own behalf in the nature of a right 
of allocution. See Levine v. United States, 362 
U.S. 610, 613-614 (1960); Brown v. United States, 
359 U.S. 41, 52 (1959); United States v. Sacher, 
182 F. 2d 416, 418 (CA 2 1950), aff'd., 343 u. s. 1. II 
Applying this statement the First Circuit said ''that all of the criteria 
fit mere refusals to testify as much as violent conduct, [and] ••• the 
citations of Levine, Brown, and In re Oliver -- all three cases involving 
only refusals to testify -- suggest that non-violent, even polite, 
recalcitrance can be subject to summary procedure. 11 (Footnote omitted.) 
The First Circuit correctly read the plain, unambiguous language of Rule 42 (a). 
(3) The decision by the Second Circuit in this case is not required 
by Harris. In Harris a witness before a Grand Jury had frustrated the 
investigation by refusing to answer questions after he had been granted 
immunity under 18 U.S. C. 6002, 6003. The witness was then taken before 
a judge and the same questions were asked of him in open court. When he 
still refused to answer the court, acting under Rule 42(a), held him in 
contempt. Although this Court reversed, the Harris opinion itself reveals 
marked difference between that case and this one. First, the rationale for 
Harris was that the real contempt occurred in the grand jury room and 
not "in the actual presence of the court. 11 Thus the terms 
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on Rule 42 (a) were not fulfilled. No such contention can be made here. 
Obviously there was no behavior obstructing justice anywhere but in a 
face-to-face confrontation with the court. Second, in Harris, bringing 
the witness into court was expressly a means to punish him swiftly. In 
reversing, this Court noted that "swiftness was not a prerequisite of 
justice • • • • Delay necessary for a hearing would not imperil the 
grand jury proceedings." 382 U.S., at 164. (Emphasis added.) Quite 
the contrary is true in the ongoing trial of a criminal case. The judge 
made it clear to respondents that delay would impede the trial. It is 
similarly clear that in a criminal trial a court cannot move from case 
to case as can a Grand Jury dealing with many cases at one time. Here 
jeopardy had attached, and absent consent of the defendant the grant of 
a mistrial would be fraught with risks. United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 
470, 485-486, 487-488 (1971). Speedy trial issues could arise in some 
cases. Witnesses available and prepared to testify may not be available 
after a continuance is allowed for a Rule 42(b) hearing. Cf. Barker v. 
Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532 (1972 ). Moreover, at the time of the refusal to 
answer, the entire machinery of the court was committed to this one case; 
jurors were in the box, counsel for prosecution and defense were present, 
as well as court reporters, bailiff and clerk. Clearly, here "swiftness 
(is] a prerequisite of justice. " 382 U.S. at 164. 
However, assuming that Harris is to be read to require the result 
reached here by the Court of Appeals, then Harris was a grossly mistaken ---
7 
reading of the rule promulgated by this Court under its rulemaking power, and I 
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would overrule Harris and return to the rule announced only six years earlier 
in Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41 (1959). That case held that the summary 
contempt power is properly used where a Grand Jury witness refuses to 
answer in court after a grant of immunity. We held in Brown that use of 
summary contempt pursuant to Rule 42(a) was appropriate because of the 
historic relationship between the court and the Grand Jury, and because the 
necessary prerequisites for exercise of that power were present: 
"This is not a situation where the contempt was in any sense 
personal to the judge, raising issues of possible unfairness 
resulting from the operation of human emotions. Cf. Cooke v. 
United States, 267 U.S. 517, 539; Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 
1; Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11. This is not a case of 
'misbehavior' involving factual issues as to the nature of the 
petitioner's conduct and whether it occurred in the 'presence' 
of the court or 'so near thereto as to obstruct the administration 
of justice. 1 Cf. Ex parte Savin, 131 U.S. 267; Ex parte Cuddy, 
131 U.S. 280;~ v. United States, 313 U.S. 33, 44-53." 
359 U.S. , at 48. 
Here the penalty imposed shows that Rule 42 (a) summary contempt is 
no Draconian measure; the judge fixed a penalty with the explicitly announced 
intention of reviewing it and giving_ respondents an opportunity to show that the 
penalty should be reduced, or done away with completely. Whatever value a 
delay would afford respondents by way of showing mitigating factors was still 
available to them under the District Judge's statement which did no more 
than articulate the time-honored principle that in cases of contempt "the least 
possible power adequate to the end proposed" should be used. In re Michael, 
326 u. s. 224, 227 (1946). 
I 
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(4) We have often said that Rule 42 (a) is simply a restatement of 
the law at the time the Rule was promulgated by this Court. Cooke v. 
United States, 267 U.S. 517; Notes of the Advisory Committee on Rule 
!/ 
42(a); Bloom v. illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 209 (1968). In Ex Parte Terry 
128 U.S. 289 (1889), this Court acknowledged that: 
"it is a settled doctrine in the jurisprudence both of England 
and of this country, never supposed to be in conflict with the 
liberty of the citizen, that for direct contempts committed 
in the face of the court, at least one of superior jurisdiction, 
the offender may, at its discretion, be instantly apprehended 
and immediately imprisoned, without trial or issue, and 
without other proof than its actual knowledge of what occurred; 
and that, according to an unbroken chain of authorities, 
reaching back to the earliest times, such power, although 
arbitrary in its nature and liable to abuse, is absolutely 
essential to the protection of the courts in the discharge 
of their functions." 128 U.S. 313. (Emphasis added.) 
Under this Rule it was never necessary that a person engage in vituperative 
conduct or physical assault in the courtroom before he is vulnerable to 
summary contempt. All that is necessary is that the judge certify that "he 
saw or heard the conduct constituting the contempt and that it was committed 
Sources contemporaneous with the adoption of this rule uniforntly 
indicate that subsection (a) is substantially a restatement of existing law, 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure with Notes and Institute Proceedings, 
73 (1946); Dession, The New Rules of Criminal Procedure II, 56 Yale L. J. 
197, 224 n. 268 (1947); Orfield, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 21 
Neb. L. Rev. 167, 210, n. 183 (1946), and was not intended to change when 
notice and a hearing are required. 
I 
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2/ 
in the actual presence of the court. 11 - It would be absurd to suggest that 
the conduct here did not occur in the actual presence of the court, and indeed 
respondents do not dispute this. A refusal to testify is the essence of contempt 
of judicial authority because it is an intentional obstruction of court pro-
ceedings, and in a very literal sense 11disrupts 11 the orderly administration 
of justice. Ex Parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289; In Re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257. 
Violent conduct, such as in Illinois v. Allen, can be dealt with readily 
without any real interference with the trial; the offender is bodily removed 
and the trial goes on. But, as this case demonstrates, a contumacious refusal 
to answer can destroy a prosecution -- and indeed even a defense. These are 
precisely the historic reasons for vesting summary contempt power in a trial 
court. 
(5) To hold that such conduct in the course of a criminal trial does not 
fall within Rule 42(a), would require us to turn our backs on the long accepted 
principle that Rule 42(a) merely codified an existing judicial power. Besides 
denigrating inherent judicial powers, the Second Circuit rule would tell judges 
that the Criminal Rules do not mean what they say in simple, unambiguous terms. 
In addition to undercutting Rules 42 (a) and 42 (b), such a holding makes all the· 
Rules more difficult to apply. This Court has the power to change its 
rules,and from time to time it does so after deliberation and reflection. It 
'f_/ 
Rule 42 applies the contempt power defined in 18 U.S. C. 401. 
That statute provides that a federal court has the power to punish by fine 
or imprisonment, at its discretion, such contempt on its authority as 
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is unwise to change them sub silentio by refusing to apply them to conduct 
clearly within their purview; indeed, it is an abuse of judicial power to do so. 
(6) Common sense and ordinary experience in the administration of 
criminal justice reveal that the rule promulgated by the Second Circuit is not 
workable. Only under Rule 42(b) is a person accused of contempt allowed 
"a reasonable time for the preparation of the defense. 11 The lack of such an 
opportunity under Rule 42(a) is the major reason the Second Circuit found it 
wanting, and in ao doing it has virtually written off the books a trial court's 
power to prevent contumacious conduct which is passive but nonetheless 
more obstructive to orderly procedure than most violent conduct. 
Obviously what is a "reasonable time" is for the trial judge in his 
discretion; however, due to the situation presented by the Second Circuit rule, 
trial judges are put in an untenable position. The litigants should be able to 
try their case when it is scheduled and when they are prepared to go forward. 
'?:_/ ( continued) 
"misbehavior of any person in its presence or so near thereto as to 
obstruct the administration of justice. " The predecessor of this statute was 
enacted to limit the broad power granted by the Judiciary Act of 1789. Nye v. 
United States, 313 U.S. 33, 45, 50 (1941). Courts had used the summary 
contempt power indiscriminately to punish persons for acts which occurred far 
from the court's view and in truth could not be considered direct affronts to its 
dignity and obstructions of justice. Thus the phrase "in its presence or so near 
thereto" was intended to apply a geographical imitation on the power. Id. 
Misbehavior actually in the .ace of the court remained punishable summarily. 
Thus in Nye the act of sending a letter to the court was no "misbehavior in the 
vicinity of the court disrupting quiet and order, or actually interrupting the 
court in the conduct of its business. 11 313 U.S. at 53. Rule 42 has not changed 
those principles; it has reaffirmed them. Here the court made it clear to 
respondents and their counsel that their refusal to answer had, in fact, 
interrupted the court in the conduct of its business. 
I I 
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However, the judge should give the alleged contemnor a 11 reasonable time II t o 
prepare a defense for obstructing the trial. These interests collide. The 
Rules as drawn clearly resolved this conflict in favor of summary power when 
the contempt is in the presence of the court. The Rules explicitly authorize 
swift punishment as imperative to prevent obstruction of justice. The Second 
Circuit turns the procedure contained in the Rules on its head. 
The result caused by this conflict seems obvious. At the whim of the 
witness, whoever has called him will just have to forgo his testimony. Here, 
of course, it was the government, but it may as often be the defendant who is 
penalized. In either case, the result is both unfair and unnecessary. 
It is entirely possible that in some trials there is no need for summary 
contempt. Perhaps a recess is feasible or perhaps the court may require a 
party to put on other witnesses out of turn while the alleged contemnor is allowe 
a reasonable time to prepare a defense or reconsider. But this varies from 
case to case, and the Rule 42 (a) procedure is wise and fair in leaving wide 
discretion in the trial judge who is aware of calendar problems, the posture 
and problems of the case, and who can best fashion a remedy. In the event 
he abuses his discretion, appellate relief is proper, but that does not call for 
the announcement l:::iy the Second Circuit or this Court of a~~ rule which 
may be wholly inappropriate in particular cases. 
The utter absurdity of the Court of Appeals I rule is graphically 
~
illustrated by this case. The only defense seriously asserted by counsel is 
that respondent Wilson, if he was given time to prepare a defense, could 
11perhaps have shown a relationship between any psychological difficulties 
and the refusal to serve as a witness. 11 Slip Op. at 8. Such a defense 
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could not be prepared by the following day, as suggested by Wilson. In fact, 
a "reasonable time" t9 prepare such a defense might be substantial. The 
suggestion by counsel at oral argument that a day might be sufficient, 
accord Marra, supra, at 1202, is simply wrong. In fact, allowing only 24 
hours here may well breach the "reasonable time II required by Rule 42 (b). 
The Second Circuit also ignores the explicit statement of the trial judge that 
all matter in mitigation would be considered at a later date. That fact probably 
accounts for the lack of an objection by counsel to the summary procedure. 
Had the summary nature of the procedure actually caused respondents serious 
prejudice and had respondents had a valid defense, or the hope of one, it 
seems objection would have been made. 
The facts here also reveal the deficiency of the procedure suggested 
by the Second Circuit in Marra. There it was suggested that the reluctant 
witness be held in civil contempt pending a Rule 42(b) hearing. Marra, supra, 
482 F. 2d, at 1202. Supposedly civil commitment would encourage the witness 
to change his mind. But commitment after criminal contempt has been adjudged 
under Rule 42 (a) would provide at least the same "encouragement, " and since 
the penalty adjudged here was not final, would provide the same hope for relief 
if the witness decided to testify. In any event, here the civil commitment 
remedy would be totally meaningless because the witness was already 
3/ 
incarcerated due to his own guilty plea. - An immediate criminal contempt 
3/ - Respondent Bryan had received a provisional twenty-five year 
sentence, the maximum. It was ultimately reduced to ten years. Respondent 
Wilson had not been sentenced pending a pre-sentence investigation. Ultimately 
he received an indeterminate term under the Youth Corrections Act. 
I 
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conviction and sentence which is to run consecutively to any sentence he is 
presently serving, feeble a club as it is, stands more chance to induce 
compliance than a civil contempt citation which offers the hope that the 
witness may prevail at his Rule 42 (b) hearing and never suffer for his 
reluctance. The situation here, where those convicted are asked to testify 
against alleged accomplices not yet convicted, is not atypical. Under the rule 
announced by the Second Circuit, such a witness has no incentive to testify 
at all. If summary contempt and sentencing is allowed, the witness at least 
sees that if he testifies he can reduce the total time he must serve. For the 
witness who is facing a relatively short sentence or the witness soon to 
go before the parole 'board, I would think this prospect would encourage 
compliance with the court order to answer. 
The witness facing a very long term may not be influenced even by a 
six-month summary contempt sentence. However, that was not the case here. 
Respondent Bryan had been provisionally sentenced to twenty-five years; 
however, he must have been well aware that it would probably be reduced, as it 
was. To him the six-month sentence must have seemed final unless he 
testified, and it was consecutive. Respondent Wilson had even greater hope for 
lenity from the sentencing judge. A psyclia.tric examination was pending on him 
and his youth and family problems made a short sentence, or even probation, 
a possibility in his mind. Since he had not yet been sentenced for the armed 
bank robbery, the six-month contempt citation was the first definitive sentence 
for him. Even if it is assumed that these citations do not provide much 
encouragement to testify for those in situations like respondents, it seems 
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clear that holding them in civil contempt pending a Rule 42(b) hearing, at 
which they may harbor hopes of entirely avoiding punishment, provides no 
incentive at all to testify. For the unfortunate person who is not testifying 
due to fear or similar reasons the trial judge here correctly noted that he 
4/ 
might reduce the contempt sentence. -
If the holding tentatively reached at Conference prevails, I assume 
the case would be remanded for a 42(b) hearing with an option open to the 
District Court to impose a civil contempt longer than six months if a jury 




The Marra court indicated that but for its own previous cases and 
Harris, it thought the procedure used here by the trial judge was reasonable 
and fair, and it would endorse that procedure. 482 F. 2d at 1200. 
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The question for decision in this case is one of proce-
dure: is the criminal contempt of nonviolently and 
respectfully refusing to testify at a criminal trial punish-
able summarily by the trial judge pursuant to Rule 42 (a) 
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure_, or must the 
trial judge prosecute the contempt on notice pursuant to 
Rule 42(b), allowing a reasonable time for the prepara-
tion of the defense? 1 A trial judge in the District 
1 Rule 42 (a) provides: 
"(a) Summary Disposition. A criminal contempt may be pun-
ished summarily if the judge certifies that he saw or heard the 
conduct constituting the contempt and that it was committed in the 
actual presence of the court. The order of contempt shall recite 
the facts and shall be signed by the judge and entered of record." 
Rule 42 (b) provides: 
" (b) Dispo,;ition Upon Notice and Hearing. A criminal contempt 
except as provided in subdivision (a) of this rule shall be prosecuted 
on notice. The notice shall state the time and place of of hearing, 
allowing a reasonable time for the preparation of the defense, and shall 
state the essentrnl facts constituting the criminal contempt charged 
and describe it as ·such. The notice shall be given orally by the judge 
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Court for the Southern District of New York summarily 
punished respondents under subdivision (a) of Rule 42 
for refusing to testify at a trial. The Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit reversed and remanded on the 
ground that Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. 162 (1965), 
and the Court of Appeals own prior decision in United 
States v. Marra, 482 .F. 2d 1196 (CA2 1973), which had 
relied upon Harris, compelled the conclusion that the 
proper course was to prosecute on notice under subdivi-
sion (b) of the Rule. 488 .F. 2d 1231 (1973). We 
granted certiorari. 416 U.S. 981 (1974). We affirm the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
One Anderson was on trial in the District Court on 
March 29, 1973, under an indictment for armed bank 
robbery of two banks, one in Tuxedo, New York, and the 
other in Mt. Ivy, New York. Before the trial respondent 
Wilson pleaded guilty to participation in the Tuxedo 
bank robbery and respondent Bryan pleaded guilty to 
participation in the Mt. Ivy bank robbery. Neither 
respondent had been finally sentenced on his plea, how-
ever,2 and each refused to testify against Anderson on 
the United States attorney or of an attorney appo'lnted by the court 
for that purpose, by an order to show cause or an order of arrest. 
The defendant is entitled to I\ trial by jury in any case in which 
an act of Congress so provides. He is entitled to admission to bail 
as provided in these rules. If the contempt charged involves dis-
respect to or criticism of a judge, that judge is disqualified from 
presiding at the trial or hearing except with the defendant's consent. 
Upon a verdict or finding of guilt the court shall enter an order fix-
ing the punishment." 
2 The trial judge who presided at Anderson's trial had deferred 
sentencing respondent Wil,;on. Another t rial judge, who had been 
a,:signed respondent Bryan'~ indictment , had imposed a provisional 
25-year t>entence pending an evaluation under 18 U.S. C. § 4208 (b). 
After Anderson's trial, Wilson was committed as a Young Adult 
Offender for an indeterminate term pursuant to 18 U. S. C. § 5010, 
(b), while Bryan's sentence was reduced to 10 years. 
-
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self-incrimination grounds, and persisted in that refusal 
even though the trial judge granted him immunity under 
18 U. S. C. §§ 6002-6003. 3 The trial judge thereupon 
3 When the privilege was invoked, Wilson's counsel was present 
and, in the absence of Bryan's counsel, attempted with the court's 
approval to represent both witnesses. 
§§ 6002-6003 provide: 
"§ 6002. Immunity generally 
"Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his privilege against 
self-incrimination, to testify or provide other information in a pro-
ceeding before or ancillary to-
"( 1) a court or grand jury of the United States, 
"(2) an agency of the United States, or 
"(3) either House of Congress, a joint committee of the two 
Houses, or a committee or a subcommittee of either House, 
"and the person presiding over the proceeding communicates to the 
witness an order issued under this part, the witness may not refuse 
to comply with the order on the basis of his privilege against self-
incrimination; but no testimony or other information compelled 
under the order ( or any information directly or indirectly derived 
from such testimony or other information) may be used against the 
witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury, giv-
ing a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the order. 
"§ 6003. Court and grand jury proceedings 
"(a) In the ca8e of any individual who has been or may be called 
to testify or provide other information at any proceeding before or 
ancillary to a. court of the United States or a grand jury of the 
UniLed States, the United States district court for the judicial dis-
trict in which the proceeding is or may be held shall issue, in accord-
ance with subsection (b) of this section, upon the request of the 
United States attorney for such district, an order requiring such 
individual to give testimony or provide other information which he 
refuses to give or provide on the basis of his privilege against self-
incrimination, such order to become effective as provided in section 
6002 of this part. 
"(b) A United States attorney may, with the approval of the 
Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General, or any designated 
Assistant Attorney General, request an order under subsection (a) of 
this section when in his judgment-
" ( 1) the testimony or other information from :mch individual may 
be neces!lary to the public interest; and 
-
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summarily adjudged each in criminal contempt and sen-
tenced each to six months imprisonment to be served 
consecutively to his sentence on the robbery conviction.4 
We decline the Government's invitation to overrule 
Harr-is v. United States, supra, and in that circumstance 
Harris clearly compels affirmance of the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals. Harris interpreted subdivision (a) of 
Rule 42 as having a narrowly limited scope and expressly 
excluded its application to a nonviolent, respectful refusal 
to answer questions on the ground of self-incrimination.0 
"(2) such individual has refused or is likely to refuse to testify 
or provide other information on the basis of his privilege against 
self-incrimination." 
4 The contempt sentences were provisional and stayed pending 
appeal. The Court of Appeals rejected the government's contention 
that the witnesses had not adequately objected to the use of summary 
contempt procedures: 
"[U]nder the circumstances, the request by counsel for Wilson 
for more time to research the fifth amendment issue constituted 
sufficient objection. And we refuse to penalize appellant Bryan 
for his failure to make timely objection to the Rule 42 (a) proceed-
ing, since his own counsel was not present. Although counsel for 
Wilson did her best to protect Bryan, the court having sanctioned 
her efforts in this regard, only a defendant's own lawyer could be 
fully aware of the considerations which might be raised in his behalf 
to mitigate a charge of contempt or the sentence thereunder, and of 
the likely usefulness of a hearing for development of these considera-
tions." United States v. Wilson. 488 F. 2d 1231 , 1234 (CA2 1973). 
At the close of the government's case, the trial judge granted 
Anderson's motion for a judgment of acquittal on the Mt . Ivy rob-
bery. The jury was unable to reach a verdict on the Tuxedo 
robbery. At a second trial, Anderson was convicted of the Tuxedo 
robbery. 
5 Respondent's self-incrimination claim was based upon a concern 
that their testimony might prejudice their sentencing. The merits 
of the claim are not before us. The Court of Appeals rejected 
respondents' contention that the immunity given was not coextensiv(!'. 
-
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The Court emphasized that subdivision (a) reached a 
narrow category of situations and "was reserved 'for ex-
ceptional circumstances' ... such as acts threatening the 
judge or disrupting a hearing or obstructing court pro-
ceedings." 382 U. S., at 164. Such acts, the Court held, 
are not present in the case of a nonviolent, respectful 
refusal to answer questions on the ground of self-
incrimination because in such a case " ... the dignity of 
the court was not being affronted; no disturbance had to 
be quelled; no insolent tactics had to be stopped." Id., 
at 165.6 
The Court stated its rationale for the narrow interpre-
tation of subdivision (a) as follows : 
11·we reach that conclusion in light of 'the concern 
long demonstrated by both Congress and this Court 
over the possible abtise of the contempt power' ... 
and in light of the wording of the Rule. Summary 
with the privilege against self-incrimination on the ground that 
neither respondent had properly raised the issue of "forbidden use": 
"If appellant Wilson doubted the ability of Judge Lasker to put out 
of his mind Wilson's statements at Anderson's trial, he should never-
theless have testified as ordered, but requested a different judge for 
sentencing on the robbery charge. Cf. Goldberg v. United States, 
472 F. 2d 513 ,516 (2d Cir. 1973). Similarly, if Bryan genuinely feared· 
an increased sentence on his guilty plea as a result of testifying in 
the Anderson case, he, too, should have given evidence, then asked. 
that proper precautions be taken (e. g., sealing the record) to insure 
that Judge Cooper would not be privy to the statements made under 
grant of immunity. Both were, however, required to obey the man--
date of 18 U. S. C. § 6002 that 'the witness may not refuse to 
comply with the order on the basis of his privilege against self-
crimination . ... '" 488 F. 2d, at 1233. 
6 Harris overruled the broader reach given subdivision (a) in 
Brown v. United States, 359 U. S. 41 (1959). This was believea 
necessary to achieve the objective of its framers that the subdivision• 
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contempt is for 'misbehavior' . . . in the 'actual pres• 
ence of the court.' Then speedy punishment may 
be necessary in order to achieve 'summary vindica• 
tion of the court's dignity and authority.' " 382 
U. S., at 164. 
The Court continued: 
"Summary procedure, to use the words of Chief 
Justice Taft, was designed to fill 'the need for im-
mediate penal vindication of the dignity of the 
court .... ' \Ve start from the premise long ago stated 
in Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat 204, 231. that the limits 
of the power to punish for contempt are 'the least 
possible power adequate to the end proposed ... .' In 
the instant case, the dignity of the court was not 
being affronted: no disturbance had to be quelled; 
no insolent tactics had to be stopped. The contempt 
here committed was far outside the narrO\v category 
envisoned by Rule 42 (a)." 382 U. S., at 165. 
Only last Term, the Court again emphasized that sum-
mary punishment for contempt "'always and rightly is 
regarded wi,th disfavor' " in light of the "heightened 
potential for abuse posed by the contempt power" and is 
to be resorted to only when necessary for "immediate 
penal vindication of the dignity of the court.'' Taylor v. 
Hayes, - V. S. -, at - (1974) . 
We see no escape from the application of Harris to this 
case based on the difference that respondents were wit-
nesses at an ongoing trial while the witness in Harr-is was 
a grand jury witness, brought before the judge and asked 
the same questions he had not answered before the grand 
jury. The Government argues that "the delay necessi-
tated by Rule 42 (b) procedures would be unlikely seri-
ously to disrupt grand jury proceedings . .. but such delay 
would have substantial disruptive effects in a trial. 'r 
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Government's Brief, at p. 23. We doubt that compliance 
with Rule 42(b) procedures necessarily would "have sub-
stantial disruptive effects in a trial" 7 but in any event 
those effects are not the kind of obstruction of court 
proceedings, Harris, supr1J,, at 164, that just~fy summary 
punishment under subdivision (a). For Harris limits 
application of that subdivision to conduct in the presence 
of the judge "where immediate corrective steps are needed 
to restore order and maintain the dignity and authority 
of the court." Johnson v. Mississippi, 403 U.S. 212, 214 
7 In Marra the Court of Appeals rejected that argument, stating : 
"In an uncomplicated case of the present type, where the facts are 
simple and a brief consultation between the witness and his retained 
or assigned counsel should be sufficiPnt to enable him to prepare 
for a Rule 42 (b) hearing, there appears to be no sound reason why 
the hearing could not be held within a day or two of the witness' 
refusal to obey the court's order. Since the hearing would in all 
likelihood require no more than an hour or two of the court 's time, 
trial of the criminal case could be suspended with a minimum disrup-
tion to the judicial process. Such a procedure, furthermore, lessens 
the risk that the witness' contumacy is the result of fright, confusion, 
or misunderstanding. Indeed, with the advice of counsel, or faced 
with imposition of a criminal sentence, he may decide to cooperate." 
482 F. 2d, at 1202. 
See also United States v. Pace_. 371 F. 2d 810 (CA2 1967). 
The Court of Appeals ;;aid of the situation in the instant case: 
"If . .. counsel had been given 'a reasonable time for the prepara-
tion of the defense,' Fed. R. Crim. P. 42 (b), she might have mar-
shalled and presented facts in mitigation of the charge. Significantly, 
the record reveals the possibility of a psychiatric defense, at least 
for Wilson. [Cf. Panico v. United States, 375 U.S. 29 (1963)] .... 
"Finally, because of the posture of the case, the record 1s silent on 
other facts which may well exist in defense or mitigation of the 
cha rge against both appellants, and which could be properly devel-
oped at a plenary hearing." 488 F. 2d, at 1234, 1235. 
The trial judge has broad discretion to specify the time for prepa-
ration of a defense to a charge of criminal contempt. See Nuvia v. 
United States, 352 U. S. ~5, a95 (1957). 
-
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(1971).8 In the case of respondents' nonviolent, respect-
ful refusal to answer questions on the ground of self-
incrimination, "the dignity of the court was not, being 
affronted," 9 Harris, supra, at 165, and the absence of that 
crucial element in rei::pondents' refusal to answer ques-
tions foreclosed application of subdivision (a) by the 
trial judge. 
Affirrned. 
8 "[Rulr 42 (b) J is controlling in any case of contempt occurring 
outside the-actual presence of the court, but it applies too to most 
cases of contrmpt in the court's preRence." 3 Wright, Federal Prac-
tice and Procedure, at 171, 172. 
9 It is undisputed that re:;pondents a:'i~erted their Fifth Amend-
ment n~ht, nonv10lently and respectfully. Indeed, the trial judge 
commented after respondent Bryan asserted the privilege, "I don't 
consider him to have a chip on his shoulder towards the Court or 
tQwards me." Transcript of°March 30, 1973, at 21. · 
C HAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
• 
.§1tp-rtmt (!fourt of tltt 'Jlittittb .§taftg 
'nras-fyittgfon. !9. (!f. 2ll.?'-"' 
January 6, 1975 
j 
Re: No . 73-1162 -- United States v. Thomas Joseph Wilson 
and Bobby Antonio Bryan 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me . 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
cc: The Conference 
- -
January 7, 1975 
No. 73-1162 U.S. v. Wilson and Bryan 
Dear Chief: 
This refers to your memorandum of January 2nd. 
In accord with my vote at the Conference, I 
agree with you that the judgment in this case should be 
reversed. The respondents persisted in refusal to 
testify during the course of the trial, even after 
being granted immunity. When respondents continued to 
refuse to answer questions, the trial judge summarily 
held them in contempt under Rule 42(a). Bryan's testimony, 
was essential to the government's case against Anderson, 
who was acquitted. 
The Court of Appeals reversed, relying on Harris 
v. United States, 382 U.S. 162 (1965), which had over-
ruled Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41 (1959) decided 
six years prior thereto. I think the Court of Appeals 
erred in its interpretation of Harris. As this Court 
noted in that case, "the real contempt ••• was committed 
before the grand jury", id. at 164. Moreover, the 
Court in Harris also recognized that the case might be 
different If the refusal to testify was "an open, 
serious threat to orderly procedure". In addition, it 
was noted that "no disturbance had to be quelled" in 
the courtroom. Id. at 165. -
The interruption of a criminal trial by 
contumacious conduct is far more serious than interruption 
of a grand jury proceeding. This may well be sufficient 
-
2. 
alone to distinguish Harris. Moreover, in Harris the 
original contempt was not cOI1111itted in the presence of 
the court. But apart from these distinctions, as I 
read that case, it recognizes that Rule 42(a) may be 
applied when the interruption of orderly procedure is 
sufficiently serious. This accords with views 
repeatedly expressed. In Ex Parte Hudl!ns'1 249 U.S. 
378, 382 (1919) the Court recognized t t 'contumacious 
refusal of a witness to testify may so directly obstruct 
a court in the performance of its duty as to justify 
punishment for contempt." In discussing summary 
contempt, Mr. Justice Black spoke of conduct in the 
presence of the Court "which disturbs the Court's 
business". In re Oliver, 333 U.S. at 275. --
I can think of ·no more serious interference 
with the "court's business" than the refusal of a key 
witness to testify after being granted imnunity. In 
the usual situation, the jury will have been sworn, 
witnesses will have been suomonsed, and the court 
calendar aqanged on the assumption that the trial will 
proceed as scheduled. I see no valid distinction between 
an interference resulting from disobedience of an order 
to testify and disobedience of an order not to be 
insolent or disruptive. In either case, the result is 
precisely the same: justice is obstructed and the 
orderly procedure of a trial is frustrated by contumacious 
conduct. 
This is not an area for arbitrary rules. 
Whether justice is obstructed is usually a question 
of fact to be resolved in the sound discretion of the 
trial judge. Of course every refusal of a witness to 
testify would not justify sU1I1Dary contempt: .!.·.&:., 
where the testimony of the witness was merely cumulative. 
If Harris must be construed in a way which 
effectively deprives trial judges of the power to 
assure that cases proceed without being aborted or 
,_ .. .. -
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unduly delayed by recalcitrant key witnesses, I would 
vote to ~verrule Harris. But I do not read Harris 
as requiring a result so drastic. In short, I think 
Harris is clearly distinguishable. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
CC: The Conference 
- -~np-rrntt <qtt1trl itf tlrt %rifth ~iait.S' 
'Jl!hurlr.ngton. lU. QJ. 21lffe'1'~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS January 30, 1975 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me in your opinion in 
73-1162, UNITED STATES v. WILSON and 
BRYAN. 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
cc: The Conference 
William O. Douglas 
CHAMBERS OF" 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
- -~n.px-tmt Qion:ri in t!rt ~~ .§taftg 
~ ulpnghtn. ~- Q}. 2llffe~~ 
March 3, 1975 
Re: 73-1162 - U. S. v. Wilson & Bryan 
MEMORANDUM TO: 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
Mr. Justice White 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
Bi 11 Brennan has asked me to reassign the op1n10n 
in the above since he has received only two concurrences 
to his draft opinion of January 6, 1975. 
Lewis wrote on January 7 expressing views consistent 
with my earlier memo of January 2. Views have varied 
as to distinguishing Harris. Some would overrule it. 
The case can be reversed either way, but before I reassign 






March 4, 1975 
No. 73-1162 U.S. v. Wilson and Bryan 
Dear Chief: 
., -
Responding to your memorandum of March 3, I reaffirm 
the views expressed in my memorandum of January 7. ' 
For the reasons stated therein, I think Harris is clearly 
distinguishable. My strong preference is to distinguish rather 
than overrule it. 
The Chief Justice 
lfp/ss 
cc: Mr·. Justice Stewart 
Mr. Justice White 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
Sincerely, 
P.S. I enclose, for your convenience, a copy of my January 
r 7 memorandum. 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
-
j;u:p-rtm.t <!}om-t of tlr.t ~nittb j;taus 
Jlras!ringhm. ~- <!J. 20'.;rJ!.c'.3 
March 4, 1975 
Re: No. 73-1162 - U. S. v. Wilson & Bryan 
. 
MEMORANDUM TO: The Chief Justice 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
I would prefer to distinguish Harris 





C HAMBERS OF 
J U STI C E P OTTER STEWART 
-
.;§uprttnt <!Jou.rt Ll f tltt ~~ ~htlt.5 
~ct,5 fyhtgf on, t0 . C!t, 20ffeJ!. 2 
March 4, 1975 
-
Re: 73-1162 - U. S. v. Wilson & Bryan 
Dear Chief, 
I see no need to overrule Harris. Rather, I would 
distinguish it primarily on the ground that it involved a 
refusal to testify before a grand jury, not a refusal to tes-
tify in an ongoing trial in the immediate presence of the 
trial judge. 
Sincerely yours, 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to Mr. Justice White 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
Mr. Justice Powell 




- -.§u:vumt <!}curl of tit~ ~ lt ~mug 
~ltlTipngfon. 10. cq:. 2llffeJ!.$ 
CH AMBERS OF 
JUST ICE H A R RY A . BLACKMUN 
March 4, 1975 
Re: No. 73-1162 - U. S. v. Wilson and Bryan 
Dear Chief: 
Had I be en on the Court at the time, I would have 
been with the majority in Brown and would have dissented 
in Harris. My v ote at conference on the present case, 
accordingly, w as a bow in Potter's direction. With his 
and Byron's reevaluation, I am willing to conform. 
I could go alon g e ither by overruling Harris or 
by distinguishing it. I think the former is the better route, 
for I doubt that the two situations are really distinguishable 
when w e look at bedrock. On the other hand, w e often dis -
tinguish to avoid over r uling. Most on the side now voting 
to reverse prefer to distin g u ish here. As of the moment, 
I probably w ould join that disposition, provided that I am 
satisfied that my doing so is not inconsistent with my cur-
r ent circulation in concurrence in No. 73-1595, Colonial 
Pipeline Co. v. Traigle. 
Sincerely, 
4~ 
The Chief Justice 
cc: Mr. Justice Stewart 
Mr. Justice White 
Mr. Justice Powell ✓ 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
, ,, 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
- -;§u:pr mtt (!Jou.rt of iltt ~ttftlt ~hilis 
~M lpngfon, 1I}. <!f. 20ffeJ!. 2 
March 4, 1975 
Re: 73-1162 - U. S. v. Wilson & Bryan 
Dear Chief, 
I see no need to overrule Harris. Rather, I would 
distinguish it primarily on the ground that it involved a 
refusal to testify before a grand jury, not a refusal to tes-
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The Chief Justice 
Copies to Mr. Justice White 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
Mr. Justice Powell 




JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
-
.§n.pumt (!Jon:rt of iltt ~th .§taus 
'J,\!r as fyhtgt~ 1B. QJ. 2llffe'1 ~ 
-
March 5, 1975 
Re: No. 73-1162 - United States v. Wilson & Bryan 
Dear Chief: 
Your memo of March 3rd asked of those of us who voted 
to reverse in this case whether we would prefer to distinguish 
Harris or overrule it. I am quite willing to distinguish it, 
but if this is done would prefer to see the proposed opinion 
written so as not to reaffirm the holding of Harris, but merely 
to state it as the holding of that case. 
Sincerely, . / p 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to: Mr. Justice Stewart 
Mr. Justice White 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
Mr. Justice Powell 
, • - .o: Mr . ~ ;·}f Just i ce Douglas Mr. Justice Brennan 
Mr . Justic~ Stewart 
Mr. Justfoe White 
Mr. Justice Karshall 
Mr. Justice Blackm/ 
Mr. Juctice Powell 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
From: 1111:1 vsa1::.L Justice 
Circulat'ed: MAY 1 197~ 
lat Dlli¥T Recirculated: 
~UPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATE~ 
No. 73-1162 
United States, Petitioner, 
v. 
Thomas Joseph Wilson 
· and Bobby Antoni~ 
Bryan. 
On w·rit of Certiorari to the 
United States ·court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit: 
[Ma.y -, 1975] 
M~: CHIEF JusTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of 
the Court. 
We granted certiorari to decide whether a district 
court may impose summary contempt punishment under 
Rule 42 (a) 1 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
when a witness who has been granted immunity, refuses 
on Fifth Amendment grounds to testify. The Court of 
Appeals held that in such circumstances a judge cannot 
dispose of the contempt summarily. but must proceE;d 
under Rule 42 (b) 2 which calls for disposition only after 
1 Rule 42 (a.) provideR: 
"(a) S11mmRr~' Disposition. A criminal contempt ma~• be pun-
islwd summarily if the judge rertifies that he saw or heard the 
conduct constituting the rontempt and that it was committed in 
the actual pre:,ence of the court. The order of contempt shall re-
cite the facts •and shall be signed by the judge and entered of 
record." 
i Rule 42 (b) provides: 
"(b) Disposition Upon Notice and Hearing. A criminal con-
tempt except as provided in subdivision (a) of this rule ;;hall be 
pro~ecuted on notice. The notice t;hall state the time and place of 
hearing, allowing a reasonable time for the preparation of the de-
fense, and shall state the essential facts constituting the criminal 









UNITED STATES v. WILSON 
notice and hearing, and "a reasonable time for the prepa-
ration of the defense." I 
Respondents Wilson and Bryan, along with one Robert 
Anderson, were charged in separate ind"ictments with 
separate bank robberies. Respondent Wilson, and An-
derson, were charged with armed· robbery of .=t, bank in 
Tuxedo, New York. Respondent Bryan, and Ander-
son, were charged- with armed- robbery of a bank in 
Mount Ivy, New York. Prior to Anderson's trial both 
respondents pleaded· guilty to charges against them, but 
neither was immediately given a final sentence. Sen-
tencing of Wilson was deferred, and-, pending a pre-
sentence report , Bryan was given a provisional 25-year 
seRtence, as required .by 18 U.S. C. §§ 4208 (b) , 4208 (c ). 
At Anderson's tria~ for the two robberies, respondents 
were summoned · as witnesses for the prosecution. When 
questioned, however, each refused to testify, contending 
that his answers might incriminate him. The judge 
tlien granted them immunity, 18 U. S. C. §§ 6002-6003,3 
and, relying on United States v. Goldberg, 472 F . 2d 513, 
516 (CA2 1973), ordered them to answer forthwith . He 
given orally by the judge in open court in the presence of the de--
fendant or, on applicat ion of the United States attorney or of an 
attorney appointed by the court for that purpose, by an order to 
show cause or an order of arrest. The defendant is entitled to a 
trial by jury in ar,y case in which an act of Congress so provides. 
He is entitled to admiss10n to bail as provided in these rules. If 
the contempt charged involves disrespect to or crit icism of a judge, 
that judge is disqual ified from presiding at the t rial or hearing· 
except with the defendant's consent. Upon a verdict or finding of 
guilt the court shall enter an order fixing the punishment." 
3 In the Court of Appeals respondents contended that the im-
munity granted was not coextensive with the scope of the Fifth 
Amendment p rivilege agaim,1: &-elf-incrimination. Kastigar v. United 
States, 406 U. S. 441, 449. The Court of Appeals ruled that re-
spondents had not raised the claim in a proper fashion , and 
respondents di.cl not seek review of that conclus1on. Thus no issue· 
<io,1cernmg the scope of immunity is. before ttt< . 
.. - -
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informed them that as long as they did not lie under 
oath they could not be prosecuted by reason of any testi-
mony, but that if they continued to refuse to answer he 
would hold them in contempt. Respondents neverthe-
less persisted in their refusals, and the judge summarily 
held them in contempt. .Counsel for Wilson, who acted 
for both respondents, argued for lenient sentences; how-
ever, she made no objection to the summary nature of 
the contempt citation,4 nor did she make any claim that 
more time was needed to prepare a defense to the con-
tempt citation. 
Both respondents were then sentenced to six months' 
imprisonment, consecutive to any sentences imposed for 
the bank robberies. The judge made it clear that he 
would consider reducing the contempt sentences, or 
eliminating them completely, if respondents decided to 
testify. When counsel pointed out that a presentence 
study was being prepared on Bryan the judge responded 
"I am going to impose the maximum .. . with the delib-
erate intention of revising that sentence to what might 
be appropriate in light of the very study that is going 
to be made." 
The trial proceeded, but without Bryan's testimony 
the evidence against Anderson on the Mount Ivy rob-
bery was such that at. the end of the Government's case 
the judge granted Anderson's motion for acquittal. The 
jury was unable to reach a verdict on the Tuxedo rob-
bery. At a later trial Anderson was convicted of that 
robbery. 
Respondents appeaied their contempt convictions. The 
4 Earlier in the proceeding counsel had requested a continuance to 
study whether respondents could be compelled to testify after a. 
grant of immunity. App. 5. The trial judge did not allow a con-
tinuance. App . 6. The Court of Appeals, however, considered that 
fo r purposes of appeal the request was sufficient objection to the-
summary contempt citation. The Government does not contest 
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Court of Appeals rejected the claim tha.t their Fifth 
Amendment rights would have been violated by com-
pelling them to testify after they had been granted im .. 
munity, but it accepted their contention that use of the 
summary contempt power was improper, and it re-
manded for proceedings under Rule 42 (b). 488 F. 2d 
1231 (CA2 1973). The court reasoned that "[i)f ..• 
counsel had been given 'a reasonable time for the prep .. 
aration of the defense,' Rule 42 (b), she might have 
marshalled and presented facts in mitigation of the 
charge." 488 F. 2d 1234.5 
In requiring Rule 42 (b) disposition the Court of 
Appeals considered it.self bound by its own previous 
decisions, and by this Court's decision in Harris v. United 
States, 382 U. S. 162 (1965) . In a previous case the 
Court of Appeals had held 
"'[S]ummary disposition is thus available only when 
immediate punishment is necessary to put an end 
5 For example, the court mentioned that respondent Wilson 's ex-
perience suggested the possibility of a psychiatric defense. With 
time to prepare, the Court of Appeal, said, counsel might have 
"enlarged on the issue of [Wilson's] mental heal.th, and perhaps 
shown a relationship between any psychologfoal difficulties and the 
refusal to serve as a witness.'' 488 F. 2d 1234-1235. The record 
does not support such a. defense. On order of the District Court, 
Wilson had been given a psychiatric examination to determine his 
competency to stand trial. 18 U. S. C. § 4244. He was found 
competent; however, at the Anderson trial his lawyer argued that 
the examination revealed family difficulties that may have been a 
reason for his antisocial behavior. App. 12-13. The District 
Court agreed that further investigation of Wilson's psychiatric prob-
lems might be helpful for sentencing purposes. App. 12, 17. The 
record does not show that either counsel or the District Court 
considered for a moment that further psychiatric investigation might 
-provide a defense to the contempt charge. The psychiatric investi~ 
gation was to determine whether Wilson might more appropriately 
be placed on probation with p;;ychiat ric treatment, rather than 
confined in a prison. App. 13, 11. 
- -
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to acts disrupting the proceedings, such as threats 
to the judge, disturbances in the courtroom or inso-
lence before the court. It is not a remedy to be 
used in a case like this where the contempt consists 
of no more than orderly refusal in the absence of 
the jury to answer a question on Fifth Amendment 
grounds .... " Unifod States v. Pace, 371 F . 2d 
810, 811 (CA2 1967) . 
In another case the Court of Appeals had interpreted 
the language of our Harris decision to require that 
"[a]bsent . . . disruptive conduct, which affronts the 
dignity of the court, a hearing pursuant to Rule 42 (b) 
is required to explore possibly exculpatory or mitigating 
circumstances." United States v. Marra, 482 F. 2d 1196, 
1200 ( CA2 1973). In the Court of Appeals' view only a 
disorderly or obstreperous interference with court proceed-
ings provides an occasion for use of the summary con-
tempt power. 482 F . 2d, at 1201-1202. 
Because of the importance of this issue in the conduct 
of criminal trials. and because the view of the Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit apparently conflicts 
with that of the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, 
Baker v. Eisenstadt, 456 F. 2d 382 (CA2 1972) , cert. 
denied, 409 U. S. 846, we granted certiorari. 416 U. S. 
981 (1974) . We reverse. 
II 
Respondents' refusals to answer, although not deliv-
ered disrespectfully, expressly fall within the language 
of Rule 42 (a) ,6 and plainly constitute contemptuous 
6 Rule 42 appl ies the contempt power defined in 18 U. S. C. § 401. 
See Bessette v. W . B. Conke-y Co., 194 U. S. 324, 326-327 (1904); 
Ex parte Robinson, 19 Wall. 505, 510 (1874) . That statute pro-
vides that a federal court has the power to punish by fine or im-
prisonment, at its discretion, such contempt of its authority as 
"misbehavior of any person in its presence or so near thereto as to 
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conduct. Rule 42 (a) was never intended to be limited 
to situations where a witness uses scurrilous language, or 
threatens or creates overt physical disorder and thereby 
disrupts a trial. All that is necessary is that the judge 
certify that he "saw or heard the conduct constitut-
ing the contempt and that it was committed in the 
actual presence of the court." Respondents do not con-
test that these requirements are met here. Indeed, here 
each refusal was in the context of a face-to-face en-
counter between the judge and respondents. See Illinou; 
v. Allen, 397 U. S. 355 (1970); Cooke v. United States, 
267 U. S. 517 (1925). 
The refusals were contemptuous of judicial authority 
because they were intentional obstructions 7 of court 
proceedings that literally disrupted the progress of the 
trial and hence the orderly administration of justice. 
Yates v. United States, 227 F. 2d 844 (CA9 1955) . Re-
ute was enacted to limit the broad power granted by the Judiciary 
Act of 1789. Nye v. United States, 313 U. S. 33, 45, 50 (1941). 
Courts had indiscriminately used the summary contempt power t-0 
punish persons for acts that occurred far from the court's view 
and which, in truth, could not be considered direct affronts to its 
dignity, and obstructions of justice. Thus the phrase "in its pres-
ence or so near thereto" was intended to apply a geographical imita-
tion on the power. Ibid. Misbeha.vior actually in the face of the 
court remained punishable summarily, and this Court made it clear 
that eontemptuous actions "actually interrupting the court in the 
conduct of its business," 313 U. S., at 53, were summarily punishable 
just as "misbehavior in the vicinity of foe court disrupting quiet 
and order." Ibid. 
7 The trial judge explained to respondents the protection accorded 
by the grant of immunity and that if they continued in their refusals 
he would hold them in contempt. He also offered them an oppor-
tunity to speak m their own behalf. Groppi v. Leslie, 404 U. S. 496, 
501 (1972) . Moreover, the Judge made it clear that he would con-
sider reducing the sentences if respondent. did testify. App. 19-20, 
21-22, 32. In view of this their continued refusals to testify can 
only be termed intentional. 
- -
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spondents' contumacious silence, after a valid grant of 
immunity followed by an explicit, unambiguous order to 
testify, impeded the due course of Anderson's trial per-
haps more so than violent conduct in the courtroom. 
Violent disruptions can be cured swiftly by bodily remov-
ing the off ender from the courtroom, or by physical 
restraints, Illinoi<; v. Allen, supra; see Ex parte Terry, 
128 U. S. 289 (1888), and the trial may proceed. But 
as this case demonstrates, a contumacious refusal to 
answer not only frustrates the inquiry but can destroy 
a prosecution, or perhaps a defense. 
The face-to-face refusal to comply with the court's 
order itself constituted an affront to the court,8 and 
when that kind of refusal disrupts and frustrates an 
ongoing proceeding, as it did here, summary contempt 
must be available to vindicate the authority of the court 
as well as to provide the recalcitrant witness with some 
incentive to testify. In re Chiles, 22 Wall. 1'57, 168 
(1875) . Whether such incentive is necessary in a par-
ticular case is a matter the Rule wisely leaves to the 
discretion of the trial court.0 
8 In order to constitute an affront to the dignity of the court the 
judge himself need not be personally insulted. Here the judge 
indicated he was not personally affronted by respondents' actions. 
He said, "I am not angry at Mr. Wilson because he refuses to 
testify. That is up to him." App. 14. He also said, "I don't 
consider [Bryan] to have a chip on his shoulder towards the court 
or towards me." App. 33. 
9 In Shi7ti·tani v. Unitea States, 384 U.S. 364,371 (1966), we said : 
"the trial judge [should] . first consider the feasibility of coercing 
testimony through the imposition of civil contempt. The judge 
should resort, to criminal sanctions only after he determines, for good 
reason, that the civil remedy would be inappropriate." 
Here, of course, that admonition carries little weight because at the 
time they acted contemptuously both respondents were incarcerated 
due to their own guilty pleas. The threat of immediate confinement 
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Our conclusion that summary contempt is available 
under the circumstances here is supported by the fact 
that Rule 42 has consistently been recognized to be no 
more than a restatement of the law existing when the 
Rule was adopted, Cooke v. United States, 267 U. S. 
517; Bloom v. Illin01".s, 391 U. S. 194, 209 (1968); Notes 
of the Advisory Committee on Rule 42 (a),10 and the 
law at that time allowed summary punishment for re-
fusals to testify. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43 (1906); 
Nelson v. United States, 201 U. S. 92 (1906); Bl,air v. 
United States, 250 U. S. 273 (1919). See Ex parte 
Hudgings, 249 U. S. 378, 382 (1919); Brown v. Walker, 
161 U. S. 591 (1896), and cases cited therein, cf. Ex 
parte Kearney, 7 Wheat. 38 (1822); In re Savin, 131 
u. s. 267 (1889). 
III 
The Court of Appeals considered itself bound by 
language in Harris v. United States, supra, to hold Rule 
42 (a) inapplicable to the facts here. 'The crucial differ-
ence between the cases, however, is that Harris did not 
deal with a refusal to testify which obstructed an ongoing 
trial. In Harris a witness before a Grand Jury had been 
granted immunity, 18 U. S. C. § 6002, and nevertheless 
refused to answer certain questions. The witness was 
testify . Nevertheless, the careful trial judge made it clear to re-
spondents that if they relented and obeyed his order he would con-
sider reducing their sentences; and he also explained that he would 
consider other factors in deciding whether to reduce the sentences. 
Supra, at 3. 
10 Sources contemporaneous with the adoption of this rule uni-
formly indicate that subsection (a) is substantially a restatement of 
existmg law, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure with Notes and 
Institute Proceedings, 73 ( 1946) ; Dession, The New Rules of Crim-
inal Procedure II, 56 Yale L. J . 197, 224 n. 268 (1947); Orfield, 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 21 Neb. L. Rev. 167, 210, n. 
183 (1946), and was not intended to alter the circumstances in 
which notice and a hearing are required , 
- -
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then brought before a district judge and asked the same 
questions again. When he stiE refused to answer the 
court summarily held him in contempt. We held in 
that case that summary contempt was inappropriate be-
cause there was no compelling reason for an immediate 
remedy. 
A Grand Jury ordinarily deals with many inquiries and 
cases at one time, and it can rather easily suspend action 
on any one, and turn to another while proceedings under 
Rule 42 (b) are completed. We noted in Harris that 
"swiftness was not a prerequisite of justice . . . . Delay 
necessary for a hearing would not imperil the grand jury 
proceedings." 382 U. S., at 164. Trial courts, on the 
contrary, cannot be expected to dart from case to case on 
their calendars anytime a witness who has been granted 
immunity decides not to answer questions. In a trial, the 
court, the parties, witnesses, and jurors are assembled 
in the expectation that it will proceed as scheduled. 
Here the District Judge pointed out this problem when 
defense counsel asked for a continuance; He said, "I 
think we cannot delay this trial. I cannot delay it. I 
have many other matters that are equally important to 
the people concerned in those cases which are follow-
ing." 11 Delay under Rule 42 (b) may be substantial, 
and all essential participants in the trial may no longer 
be readily available when a trial reconvenes. In Harris 
this Court recognized these problems in noting that sum-
mary punishment may be necessary where a "refusal 
[is] .. . an open, serious threat to orderly procedure." 
382 U. S., at 165. A refusal to testify during a trial may 
be such an open, serious threat, and here it plainly con-
stituted a literal "breakdown" in the prosecution's case.12· 
11 App. 6. 
12 Another distinction between this case and Harris is that there 
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IV 
In an ongoing trial with the judge, jurors, counsel and 
witnesses all waiting Rule 42 (a) provides an appro-
priate remedial tool to discourage witnesses from contu-
macious refusals to comply with lawful orders essential 
to prevent a breakdown of the proceedings. Where 
time is not of the essence, however, the provisions of Rule 
42 (b) may be more appropriate to deal with contemptu-
ous conduct. We adhere to the principle that only "the 
least possible power adequate to the end proposed" 
should be used in contempt cases. Anderson v. Dunn, 6 
Wheat. 204, 231 (1821). See Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 
488, 498 (1974). As with all power, the authority 
under Rule 42 (a) to punish summarily can be abused ; 
the courts of appeals, however, can deal with abuses of 
discretion without restricting the Rule in contradiction 
of its express terms, and without unduly limiting the 
power of the trial judge to act swiftly and firmly to pre-
vent contumacious conduct from disrnpting the orderly 
progress of a criminal trial. 
Reversed. 
t o answer in court was metely a re-enactment. 359 U. S., at 164. 
Thus there was doubt whether the requirement of Rule 42 (a) that 
the contempt take place "in the actual presence of the court" wa 
fulfilled. See supra, at 6. Here the contumacious conduct occurred. 
&'()lely in a direct confronta.tion wtth the court. 
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spondents' contumacious silence, after a valid grant of 
immunity followed by an explicit, unambiguous order to 
testify, impeded the due course of Anderson's trial per-
haps more so than violent conduct in the courtroom. 
Violent disruptions can be cured swiftly by bodily remov-
ing the offender from the courtroom, or by physical 
restraints, Illinoi,1; v. Allen, supra; see Ex parte Terry, 
128 U. S. 289 (1888), and the trial may proceed. But 
as this case demonstrates, a contumacious refusal to 
answer not only frustrates the inquiry but can destroy 
a prosecution, or perhaps a defense. 
The face-to-face refusal to comply with the .:-court1s-
order itself constituted an affront to the court,8 -~nd 
when that kind of refusal disrupts and frustrates -an 
ongoing proceeding, as it did here, summary contempt 
must be available to vindicate the authority of the court 
as well as to provide the recalcitrant witness with some 
incentive to testify. In re Chiles, 22 Wall. 1-57, 168 
( 1875). Whether such incentive is necessary in a par-
ticular case is a matter the Rule wisely leaves to the 
discretion of the trial court.9 
8 In order to constitute an affront to the dignity of the court the 
judge himself need not be personally insulted . Here the judge 
indicated he was not personally affronted by respondents' actions. 
He said, "I am not angry at Mr. Wilson because he refuses to 
testify. That i5 up to him." App. 14. He also said, "I don't 
consider [Bryan} to have a chip on his shoulder towards the court 
or towards me." App. 33. 
9 In Shillitaniv. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 371 (1966), we said: 
"the trial judge [should] _ first consider the feasibility of coercing 
testimony through the imposition of civil contempt. The judge-
should resort to criminal sanctions only after -he determines, for good 
reason, that the civil remedy would be inappropriate." 
Here, of course, that admonition carries little weight because at the-
time they acted contemptuous!~· both respondents were incarcerated 
due to their own guilty pleas. 't fhe threat of immediate confinement 
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Our conclusion that :rnmmary contempt is available 
under the circumstances here is supported by the fact 
that Rule 42 has consistently been recognized to be no 
more than a restatement of the law existing when the 
Rule was adopted, Cooke v. United States, 267 U. S. 
517; Bloom v. Illinoi,s , 391 U. S. 194, 209 (1968) ; Notes 
of the Advisory Committee on Rule 42 (a),1-0 and the 
law at that time allowed summary punishment for re-
fusals to testify. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43 (1906); 
Nelson v. United States, 201 U. S. 92 (1906) ; Blair v. 
United States, 250 U. S. 273 (1919) . See Ex parte 
Hudgings, 249 U. S. 378, 382 (1919) ; Brown v. Walker, 
161 U. S. 591 (1896), and cases cited therein, cf. Ex 
parte Kearney, 7 Wheat"' 38 (1822) ; In re Savin, 131 
u. s. 267 (1889). 
III 
The Court of Appeals considered itself bound by 
language in Harris v. United States, supra, to hold Rule 
42 (a ) inapplicable to the facts here. The crucial differ-
ence between the cases, however, is that Harris did not 
deal with a refusal to testify which obstructed an ongoing 
' trial. In Harris a witness before a-Grand Jury had been 
granted immunity, 18 U. S. C. § 6002, and nevertheless 
refused to answer certain questions. The witness was 
testifyJ NevertheleS5, the ca reful t rial judge made it clear to re-
spohdents that if they relented and obeyed his order _he would con-
sider reducing their sentences; and he also explained that he would 
F. 2d 116 5 ( CA 7 consider other factors in deciding whether t o reduce the sentences. 
1974), cert denied Supra, at 3. 
U. S . • 10 Sources contemporane:ms with the ad option of this rule uni-
formly indicate that subsection (a) 1s substant ially a restatement of 
existing law, Federal Rules of Cnminal Procedure with Notes and 
Institute Proceedings, 73 (1946) ; Dess10n, The New Rules of Crim-
inal Procedure II, 56 Yale L. J . 197 , 224 n . 268 (1947) ; Orfield, 
F ederal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 21 Neb. L. R ev. 167, 210, n . 
183 (1946), and was not intended t o alter the circumstances in 
which notice and a hearing are required. 
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